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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMO FOR:      HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:            WINSTON LORD

SUBJECT:        Transcripts of the October  
                  Peking Trip

Attached are transcripts of three more meetings between you and Chou in October:

Tab A - October 22, on Korea, Japan, South Asia, the Soviet Union, and Arms Control. (You have already glanced at this one.)

Tab B - October 23, the evening sitting room session on the President's visit.

Tab C - October 24, morning, which includes Chou's tough speech and your rebuttal.

cc: General Haig

DOS Review Completed.

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IN 41110

POINTS

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NY intgSouth Asia

- The current military situation is still somewhat unclear.
- What is clear is that the Indians, by using the Mukti Bahini and some of their own forces, are trying to provoke Pakistan into a counter-attack that would give New Delhi an excuse for all-out war.
- We are thus tetering on the edge of full-scale hostilities.  
(You may wish to give a brief rundown of our latest intelligence reports from the WSAG meeting, as updated.)
- As I explained to the Prime Minister, we have clearly seen the Indian game from the beginning. At the outset they had a legitimate problem caused by the mass influx of refugees. And the Pakistanis did not display much imagination.
- However, the Indians have used the problem of East Pakistan as a wedge to try and crumble West Pakistan as well. Every time President Yahya has made a gesture, the Indians have increased their demands. For example, first Yahya was told to spare Mujib's life, then he was told to let Mujib designate a spokesman to talk to the Pakistani government. Now the demand is that he release Mujib and deal only with him.
- Clearly, New Delhi is forcing political demands on Yahya which can only serve to topple him. If the Indians were willing to wait a few

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*Brundell*  
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*My talk with  
Sultan Khan*

months, events would move in a direction favorable to them in East Pakistan.

*Pres. talk with  
myself*

-- Our problem in this country has been compounded by substantial pro-Indian sentiment in the bureaucracy, Congress, and media.

-- Nevertheless, in addition to providing massive humanitarian help in both East Pakistan and India, our efforts over the past months have been concentrated on warning the Indians and Soviets of the dire consequences of hostilities.

-- We have also encouraged President Yahya to take certain steps to remove Indian pretexts for attack. ~~(checklist at Tab )~~.

-- One of the most helpful proposals by Yahya is that the two countries pull back their forces from the border. The Indians have refused to do this.

-- Let me run down the steps my government is taking and has taken to prevent hostilities.

#### Present Steps

*today*  
-- We have sent a message to New Delhi which said we would not understand an Indian decision to resort to war. *(cable at T of A)*

*today*  
-- We have sent a message to Islamabad ~~(cable at Tab A)~~ which thanks Yahya for his restraint, appreciates his difficulties and repeats that political solution, not hostilities is the only answer. *(cable at Tab B)*

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*Today*  
-- We have sent a message to Moscow which notes special USSR responsibility, given the Soviet-Indian treaty and Soviet arms shipments, and again urges Soviet restraint on India and cessation of deliveries of arms (cable at Tab C).

-- *We are also going to the British and Germans.*  
-- We are also considering going to the United Nations with this matter.

-- Frankly, we have not been anxious to see this problem raised there. We had hoped other efforts would cool the situation and allow time for political evolution in East Pakistan.

-- However, events in recent days will probably bring inevitable UN involvement. And we understand that Pakistan might take this issue to the Security Council in the next couple of days.

-- We believe that the UN might serve as a restraint on India and that the line-up on the Security Council should make for a balanced resolution.

-- We would welcome your views on what the UN role should be and why type of Security Council resolution should emerge.

-- We think a resolution along the following lines might be helpful:

1) Calls upon all states to refrain from any actions that would endanger the peace in the area;

2) Urges all parties concerned to refrain from actions which would violate the territorial integrity of India and Pakistan.

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3) Requests the Government of Pakistan to continue urgently its efforts towards creating a favorable climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

4) Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all possible measures to facilitate the safe and speedy return of the refugees to their homes;

[ 5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offering Good Offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in the area. ]

[Alternative Para 5): Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to consider availing themselves of such Good Offices as they may deem appropriate. ]

NOTE We would regard operative para 5 as optional and could accept Resolution without it.

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Past Steps

-- We have made unmistakably clear to the Indians that a resort to hostilities is unacceptable and would have serious consequences. I have personally warned the Indian Ambassador on several occasions that in the event of Indian aggression we would cut off our economic aid. (HAK-Jha in San Clemente and Washington. President and Mrs. Gandhi, November 4.)

-- We have also urged the Russians to exercise restraint on India and have said that their arms shipments exacerbate the problem. Their response is that they are restraining New Delhi and that their arms shipments are insignificant. (HAK-Dobrynin, November 18, 15 and 4, and previous.)

-- Our specific efforts to effect a mutual pullback and encourage a political dialogue have been as follows:

- . October 11: Our Ambassador in Pakistan suggested to President Yahya a mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops and armor. Yahya agreed "in toto" if the details could be worked out.
- . October 16: Our Ambassador in India approached the Indians with the mutual withdrawal idea. The Indians

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threw up a smokescreen, responding that India could agree if the Pak threat were removed but meanwhile India must continue protective measures.

- . October 18: Our Ambassador in Moscow informed the Soviets of the result of our approaches on withdrawal to the Indians and Paks and suggested that the Soviets also encourage the Indians to accept.
- . Nov. 2: Our Ambassador in Pakistan saw Yahya and
  - (1) suggested initial unilateral Pak withdrawal and
  - (2) discussed next political steps, perhaps with Mujib. Yahya accepted the idea of unilaterally withdrawing his forces, although not all the way back to the barracks. He also indicated that he was prepared to meet with a cleared Awami Leaguer from Dacca, or a Bangla Desh representative from India not charged with a major crime and would "consider" meeting with a Bangla Desh leader designated by Mujib.
- . Nov. 3: The Pakistani Ambassador informed me that Yahya would be willing to go through with unilateral

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withdrawal "provided" Mrs. Gandhi gave an undertaking to President Nixon that Indian forces would withdraw shortly afterwards.

. Nov. 4: The President warned Mrs. Gandhi of the grave consequences of military conflict and the impact on world peace and on our bilateral relations. He said we could not accept policies which would in effect overthrow Yahya. He outlined all the reasonable steps Yahya had taken and urged India to respond to his offer of mutual pullback of forces. Mrs. Gandhi blamed everything on Pakistan and did not respond to the pullback idea. (Full memcon at Tab E.)

. Nov. 4-5: The Indians during Mrs. Gandhi's visit indicated that they were unable to agree to any troop withdrawal as long as the Pakistani "threat" remained. Meetings between Yahya and cleared Awami League or Bangla Desh leaders were characterized as a non-starter. They only showed slight interest in talks between Yahya and a Mujib designee.

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- . Nov. 11: The State Department called in Indian and Pak ambassadors to express US concern over continuing clashes along the east Pak/India border and warned the Indians that we had information that their regular troops were involved.
- . Nov. 15-17: Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan in Washington was briefed on the outcome of the Gandhi visit. I outlined the steps we had taken, including our warnings to the Soviets that their arms shipments were inflaming the situation, that war would not be understood in the U.S., and any Soviet role in the war would worsen U.S.-Soviet relations. We also explored possible political steps to put Pakistan in a better public position and ease the situation in East Pakistan. (Full memo at Tab F.)
- . Nov. 20: Yahya informed our ambassador in Pakistan that he would not talk with any Mujib designee. He also said he would not begin war with India, although Pakistan would have to protect itself.

*Sultan Khan*  
*dam*

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